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Abstract
We present a modular approach to de¯ning logics for a wide variety of state-based
systems. The systems are modelled as coalgebras, and we use modal logics to specify
their observable properties. We show that the syntax, semantics and proof systems
associated to such logics can all be derived in a modular fashion. Moreover, we show
that the logics thus obtained inherit soundness, completeness and expressiveness
properties from their building blocks. We apply these techniques to derive sound,
complete and expressive logics for a wide variety of probabilistic systems, for which
no complete axiomatisation has been obtained so far.
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1 Introduction
Modularity has been a key concern in software engineering since the conception
of the discipline [22]. This paper investigates modularity not in the context
of building software systems, but in connection with specifying and reasoning
about systems. Our work focuses on reactive systems, which are modelled as
coalgebras over the category of sets and functions. The coalgebraic approach
provides a uniform framework for modelling state-based and reactive systems
[28]. In particular, coalgebras provide models for a large class of probabilistic
systems, as shown by the recent survey [3], which discusses the coalgebraic
modelling of eight di®erent types of probabilistic systems.
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° : C ! TC, which maps every state c 2 C to the observations °(c) that
can be made of c after one transition step. Di®erent types of systems can
then be represented by varying the type T of observations. A closer look at
the coalgebraic modelling of state-based and reactive systems reveals that, in
nearly all cases of interest, the type T of observations arises as the composite
of a small number of basic constructs.
The main goal of this paper is to lift this compositionality which exists at the
level of observations to the level of speci¯cation logics and proof systems. That
is, we associate a speci¯cation logic and a proof system to every basic type
construct, and show how to obtain speci¯cation logics and proof systems for a
combination of constructs, in terms of the ingredients of the construction. Our
main technical contribution is the study of the properties which are preserved
by a combination of logics and proof systems. On the side of logics, we isolate a
property which ensures that combined logics have the Hennessy-Milner prop-
erty w.r.t. behavioural equivalence, that is, the logical equivalence of states
coincides with behavioural equivalence. Since this property is present in all
of the basic constructs and is preserved by each combination of constructs,
we automatically obtain expressive speci¯cation logics for a large class of sys-
tems. Concerning proof systems, our main interests are the soundness and
completeness of the combined logical systems. In order to guarantee both,
we investigate conditions which ensure that soundness and completeness of a
combination of logics are inherited from the corresponding properties of the
ingredients of the construction. Again, we demonstrate that this property is
present in all basic building blocks.
As an immediate application of our compositional approach, we obtain sound,
complete and expressive speci¯cation logics for a large class of probabilistic
system types. While the Hennessy-Milner property has already been estab-
lished for a number of such logics [19,13,9], sound and complete axiomatisa-
tions for these logics have only been studied for a simple type of probabilistic
systems, namely unlabelled probabilistic transition systems [10]. The modular
approach presented in this paper allows us to also derive a completeness re-
sult for the probabilistic modal logic of [13] (interpreted over Segala's simple
probabilistic automata [29]), as well as a logic with a sound and complete
axiomatisation for Segala's general probabilistic automata [29].
Our main technical tool to establish the above results is the systematic ex-
ploitation of the fact that coalgebras model the one-step behaviour of systems,
i.e. that one application of the coalgebra map allows us to extract informa-
tion about one transition step of the system being modelled. This one-step
behaviour of systems is parallelled both on the level of speci¯cation logics and
on the level of proof systems. Regarding speci¯cation logics, we introduce the
notion of syntax constructor, which speci¯es a set of syntactic features allow-
2ing the formulation of assertions about the next transition step of a system.
The notion of one-step semantics then speci¯es how to interpret these syntac-
tic features over the next transition step. Finally, a proof system constructor
speci¯es how one can infer judgements about the next transition step.
These notions are used to make assertions about the global system behaviour,
by viewing this behaviour as the strati¯cation of the observations which can
be made after a (¯nite) number of transition steps. This is again parallelled
both on the level of logics and on the level of proof systems. Completeness, for
example, can be established by isolating the corresponding one-step notion,
which we call one-step completeness, and proving by induction on the num-
ber of transition steps that one-step completeness entails completeness in the
ordinary sense. Expressiveness and soundness are treated similarly by consid-
ering the associated notions of one-step expressiveness and one-step soundness.
When combining the logics, we combine the syntax constructors, the associ-
ated one-step semantics and the proof system constructors, and show that such
combinations preserve one-step soundness, completeness and expressiveness.
Our approach generalises previous work on coalgebraic modal logic, includ-
ing the abstract coalgebraic logic of Moss [21], and the concrete logics for
coalgebras proposed in [17,27,11]. In particular, our approach provides logics
with sound and complete axiomatisations for probabilistic models. Moreover,
thanks to the modular treatment of languages and their associated semantics,
our logics are easily extensible to accommodate more features of state-based
systems. A consequence of this wider generality is that our logics fail to be
strongly complete, and accordingly our treatment is focused on weak com-
pleteness instead.
Regarding further work, we plan to extend our approach to more expres-
sive logics, in particular to coalgebraic versions of CTL [7] and of the modal
¹-calculus [16]. Also, it remains to be explored in what way our setup in-
duces logics for programming languages with coalgebraically de¯ned semantics
[30,14,2].
2 Preliminaries and Notation
We denote the category of sets and functions by Set, and pick a ¯nal object
1 = f¤g. Binary products (coproducts) in Set are written X1 £X2 (X1 +X2),
with canonical projections ¼i : X1 £ X2 ! Xi (canonical injections ¶i : Xi !
X1 + X2) for i = 1;2. If R µ X1 £ X2 is a relation and T : Set ! Set is an
endofunctor, we write TR µ TX1 £TX2 for the relation de¯ned by t1 (TR)t2
if there exists w 2 TR such that T¼1(w) = t1 and T¼2(w) = t2. Finally, the
set of functions from Y to X is denoted by XY.
3We write M : Set ! Set for the (inclusion-preserving) functor taking a set A
(of atoms) to the set of propositional formulas built from atoms in A together
with the propositional constant false (®), by closing under implication (!).
The remaining propositional connectives can be de¯ned on MA in terms of ®
and ! in the usual way.
We use endofunctors T : Set ! Set, subsequently referred to as signature
functors, to specify particular system types. A signature functor T speci¯es
the structure of the information which can be observed of the system states
in one step. Systems themselves are modelled as T-coalgebras.
De¯nition 1 (Coalgebras, morphisms) A T-coalgebra is a pair (C;°) with
C a set (the carrier or state space of the coalgebra) and ° : C ! TC a func-
tion (the coalgebra map, or transition structure). A T-coalgebra morphism
f : (C;°) ! (D;±) is a function f : C ! D such that Tf ± ° = ± ± f. The
category of T-coalgebras and T-coalgebra morphisms is denoted by CoAlg(T).
For (C;°) 2 CoAlg(T), the transition structure ° determines the observations
°(c) 2 TC which can be made from a state c 2 C in one transition step.
Morphisms between coalgebras preserve this one-step behaviour. The next
example shows that coalgebras can be used to model a wide variety of state-
based systems, including non-deterministic and probabilistic ones:
Example 2 We write P : Set ! Set for the (covariant) powerset functor,
P! : Set ! Set for the ¯nite powerset functor (i.e. P!(X) = fY µ X j
Y ¯niteg), and D : Set ! Set for the ¯nite probability distribution functor,
de¯ned by
DX = f¹ : X ! [0;1] j ¹(x) 6= 0 for ¯nitely many x 2 X and
X
x2X
¹(x) = 1g:
(1) For TX = (PX)A, T-coalgebras ° : C ! (PC)A are in one-to-one
correspondence with A-labelled transition systems (C;R), where R µ C£
A £ C is de¯ned by (c;a;c0) 2 R i® c0 2 °(c)(a). Similarly, coalgebras
for TX = (P!X)A are precisely the image-¯nite transition systems.
(2) For TX = PX £PD, T-coalgebras ° : C ! PC £PD are in one-to-one
correspondence with Kripke models (C;R;V ) over the set D of proposi-
tional atoms, with the accessibility relation R being given by (c;c0) 2 R
i® c0 2 ¼1(°(c)), and with the valuation V : C ! PD being given by
¼2 ±°. Similarly, every P-coalgebra determines a Kripke frame and vice-
versa.
(3) Coalgebras for TX = (1+DX)A are the A-labelled probabilistic transition
systems of [19] (see [8] for details). These have also been called reactive
probabilistic systems in [31], and are di®erent from the probabilistic tran-
sition systems considered in [13], which are treated next.
(4) The simple and general probabilistic automata of [29] can be modelled as
4coalgebras for TX = (PDX)A and TX = P(D(A £ X)), respectively.
Replacing the unbounded powerset functor by the ¯nite powerset func-
tor in these de¯nitions yields image-¯nite variants of these two types of
systems. The image-¯nite simple probabilistic automata are called proba-
bilistic transition systems in [13].
Note that all the endofunctors in the previous example arise as combinations
of a small number of simple functors (constant, identity, powerset and prob-
ability distribution functor) using products, coproducts, exponentiation with
constant sets and composition. A recent survey of existing probabilistic mod-
els of systems [3] identi¯ed no less than eight probabilistic system types of
interest, all of which can be written as such combinations. This paper derives
logics and proof systems for these probabilistic system types, using similar
combinations on the logical level.
Apart from making this kind of compositionality explicit, the coalgebraic ap-
proach also allows a uniform de¯nition of behavioural equivalence, which spe-
cialises to standard notions of equivalence in many important examples.
De¯nition 3 (Behavioural equivalence) Given two T-coalgebras (C;°) and
(D;±), two states c 2 C and d 2 D are called behaviourally equivalent (writ-
ten c ' d) if there exist T-coalgebra morphisms f : (C;°) ! (E;²) and
g : (D;±) ! (E;²) such that f(c) = g(d).
Any T-coalgebra (C;°) induces an !-indexed sequence of maps °n : C ! T n1,
where T n denotes the n-fold application of the signature functor T. The maps
°n are de¯ned by induction on n: °0 : C ! 1 is the unique such map, and
°n+1 = T°n ± ° for n 2 !. Intuitively, T n1 contains all possible T-behaviours
observable through n unfoldings of the coalgebra structure, while °n maps
states of the coalgebra to their n-step observable behaviour. A notion of ob-
servational equivalence which only takes ¯nitely observable behaviour into
account can now be de¯ned as follows:
De¯nition 4 (!-behavioural equivalence) Given T-coalgebras (C;°) and
(D;±), two states c 2 C and d 2 D are called !-behaviourally equivalent
(written c '! d) if °n(c) = ±n(d) for all n 2 !.
Remark 5 The notion of !-behavioural equivalence is strictly weaker than
behavioural equivalence. However, for endofunctors whose ¯nal sequence sta-
bilises in at most !+! steps, the two notions coincide (see [32,25]). The class
of endofunctors with this property includes the !-accessible ones, and is closed
under arbitrary coproducts of functors, as well as under I-indexed limits of
functors, with I a small category [32].
As a result, !-behavioural equivalence coincides with behavioural equivalence
both in the case of image-¯nite transition systems, and in the case of prob-
5abilistic transition systems (with each of the functors P!
A and (1 + D)A be-
ing obtained as a limit of !-accessible functors). It is often possible to de-
¯ne ¯nitary logics for which logical equivalence coincides with !-behavioural
equivalence. On the other hand, we can not in general hope to characterise
behavioural equivalence by a logic with ¯nitary syntax.
It can also be shown that, for weak pullback preserving endofunctors, the no-
tion of behavioural equivalence coincides with the span-based notion of coalge-
braic bisimilarity, as de¯ned by Aczel and Mendler [1] and studied by Rutten
[28]. All functors considered in the following are weak pullback preserving.
De¯nition 6 (Bisimulation, bisimilarity) A T-bisimulation between two
T-coalgebras (C;°) and (D;±) is given by a relation R µ C £ D that can be
equipped with a T-coalgebra structure (R;½) which makes the projections ¼R
1 :
R ! C and ¼R
2 : R ! D T-coalgebra morphisms. The largest T-bisimulation
between (C;°) and (D;±) is called T-bisimilarity.
Coalgebraic bisimulation (bisimilarity) instantiates to known notions of bisim-
ulation (bisimilarity) in concrete cases.
Example 7 We consider the system types introduced in Example 2.
(1) For A-labelled transition systems, i.e. coalgebras for TX = (PX)A, T-
bisimulation coincides with Park-Milner bisimulation [23,20].
(2) For Kripke models over the set D of propositional atoms, i.e. coalgebras
for TX = PX £ PD, T-bisimulation coincides with the standard notion
of bisimulation, as de¯ned e.g. in [4].
(3) For coalgebras for TX = (1+DX)A, that is, A-labelled probabilistic tran-
sition systems, T-bisimulation coincides with the notion of probabilistic
bisimulation considered in [19]. (This is proved in [8].)
(4) For coalgebras for TX = (PDX)A, that is, simple probabilistic automata,
T-bisimulation coincides with the stronger notion of bisimulation de¯ned
in [13]. (This is called simply bisimulation in loc.cit., in order to distin-
guish it from a weaker notion of equivalence referred to as probabilistic
bisimulation.)
A more detailed analysis of probabilistic systems from a coalgebraic point of
view can be found in [3].
3 Modular Construction of Modal Languages
In this section we introduce syntax constructors and the modal languages
they de¯ne. If we consider a modal language L as an extension of the basic
6propositional language, the idea of a syntax constructor is that it describes
what needs to be added to the propositional language in order to obtain L.
The important feature of syntax constructors is that they can be combined in
the same way as the signature functors which de¯ne the particular shape of
the systems under consideration.
After introducing the abstract concept, we give examples of some basic syntax
constructors, and show how they can be combined in order to obtain more
complex syntax constructors, and hence more structured modal languages.
De¯nition 8 (Syntax constructor, induced language) A syntax con-
structor is an !-accessible endofunctor S : Set ! Set which preserves in-
clusions, i.e. SX µ SY whenever X µ Y . The language L(S) associated with
a syntax constructor S is the least set F (of formulas) such that
² ® 2 F,
² ' ! Ã 2 F whenever ';Ã 2 F,
² SF µ F.
In the above de¯nition we silently assume that, for any set X, the elements of
SX are su±ciently fresh, in the sense that ® = 2 SX and ' ! Ã = 2 SX whenever
';Ã 2 X.
The assumptions in De¯nition 8 ensure that the language associated with
a syntax constructor S carries the structure of an initial L-algebra, where
LX = 1+(X £X)+SX. Of course, one could have taken L(S) as (the carrier
of) the initial L-algebra directly, but the present treatment avoids abstract
syntax and allows us to construct languages as least ¯xpoints for monotone
operators on sets in the usual way.
Recall that the image SX of a set X under an inclusion-preserving and !-
accessible endofunctor S can always be reconstructed from the sets SY for
¯nite subsets Y µ X. More formally, if X is a set and x 2 SX, we can always
¯nd a ¯nite subset Y µ X such that x 2 SY . The requirement that SF µ F in
De¯nition 8 is therefore equivalent to S© µ F whenever © is a ¯nite subset of
F. Thus, the !-accessibility of S ensures that the construction of L(S) termi-
nates after ! steps, that is, we are dealing with ¯nitary languages. Technically,
we often use induction on the rank (nesting depth of modal operators) of a
formula as a proof principle, and !-accessibility guarantees that the induction
terminates at !.
Example 9 (1) If D is a set (of atomic propositions), then the constant
functor SDL = D is a syntax constructor. The associated language L(SD)
is the set of propositional formulas over the set D of atoms.
(2) If Id : Set ! Set is the identity functor, then the functor SId : Set ! Set
which maps a set L to the set SIdL = f±' j ' 2 Lg is a syntax con-
7structor. The associated language is similar to the standard modal lan-
guage over the empty set of atomic propositions. However, this language
will be interpreted over Id-coalgebras, which provide a trivial model of
deterministic systems.
(3) If M is a (possibly in¯nite) set of modal operators with associated ¯nite
arities, then SM is a syntax constructor, where SM maps a set L (of for-
mulas) to the set SM(L) of formal expressions, given by
SM(L) = fm('1;:::;'n) j m 2 M is n-ary and '1;:::;'n 2 Lg:
Viewing M as an algebraic signature, SM(L) is the set of terms with ex-
actly one function symbol applied to variables in L. In the literature on
modal logic, M is called a modal similarity type [4]. The language asso-
ciated with SM is the set of modal formulas with modalities in M over
the empty set of propositional variables. When writing such formulas, we
shall assume that the modal operators bind more tightly than any of the
boolean operators. For later reference, we let SP = SP! = Sf2g where 2
has arity one, and SD = SM where M = fLp j p 2 Q\[0;1]g, Q denotes the
set of rational numbers, and each Lp has arity one. The language associ-
ated with SP is the standard modal language over the empty set of atomic
propositions. The language associated with SD has a countable number of
unary modalities, and has been used to describe properties of probabilistic
transition systems [19,13,10]. The intended reading of a formula Lp' is
\the probability of ' holding in the next state is at least p".
(4) If T is an inclusion-preserving, !-accessible endofunctor, then S = T
quali¯es as a syntax constructor, and the associated language L(S) is a
variant of Moss's coalgebraic logic for the functor T. In the original treat-
ment [21], the language is in¯nitary and only has modal operators (ob-
tained using functor application) and in¯nitary conjunctions. In contrast,
the language L(S) is ¯nitary and comes with all standard propositional
connectives.
We are now ready for the ¯rst modularity issue of the present paper: the
combination of syntax constructors to build more powerful languages from
simple ingredients.
De¯nition 10 (Combinations of syntax constructors) Consider the fol-
lowing operations on sets L1;L2 (of formulas):
L1 ­ L2 = f[¼i]' j ' 2 Li; i = 1;2g
L1 © L2 = fh·ii' j ' 2 Li; i = 1;2g
L1 ¯ E = f[e]' j ' 2 L1; e 2 Eg
8where E is an arbitrary set. For syntax constructors S1;S2 we let
(S1 ­ S2)L = MS1L ­ MS2L (S1 © S2)L = MS1L © MS2L
(S1 ¯ E)L = MS1L ¯ E (S1  S2)L = S1MS2L:
Recall that M takes a set to the set of propositional formulas over that set.
Note that the above operations are of a purely syntactical nature. The addition
of the symbols [¼i], h·ii and [e] will later ensure that the languages associated
with S1 ­ S2, S1 © S2 and S1 ¯ E can be given a well-de¯ned semantics.
When combining syntax constructors, we add another layer of modal oper-
ators to the syntax already de¯ned. Closure under propositional connectives
(through the application of M) is needed to express propositional judgements
also at the level on which the construction operates, e.g. to have formulas of
the form h·ii(:2' ^ 2Ã) in L(SP © SP).
The above de¯nition is modelled after the de¯nition of signature functors.
Languages of form L(S1 ­ S2) and L(S1 © S2) will be used to formalise prop-
erties of systems whose signature functors are of form T1 £ T2 and T1 + T2,
respectively, while the language L(S1 ¯ E) provides a means to reason about
systems with signature functor T1
E. The clause dealing with the composition
of syntax constructors gives rise to S1-modal operators which are indexed by
S2-formulas. Alternatively, the composition of two syntax constructors can be
thought of as introducing an additional sort for formulas, as illustrated in the
next example.
Example 11 Suppose SiL = f2i' j ' 2 Lg for i = 1;2. Then the language
L = L(S1  S2) can be described by the following grammar:
L 3 ';Ã ::= ® j ' ! Ã j 21½ (½ 2 L
0)
L
0 3 ½;¾ ::= ® j ½ ! ¾ j 22' (' 2 L)
Languages of this kind have a two-layer structure, corresponding to systems
that exhibit two di®erent types of behaviour (modelled by 21 and 22, respec-
tively) in an alternating fashion. They are used to specify properties of systems
whose signature functor T is the composition of two functors: T = T1 ± T2.
In order to capture all possible behaviours described by T, we ¯rst have to
describe the T2-behaviours, and then use these descriptions to specify the
observations which can be made according to T1. Since propositional connec-
tives will in general be necessary to capture all possible T2-behaviours, the
de¯nition of the syntax constructor S1  S2 involves the closure under propo-
sitional connectives before applying S1. Thus, the introduction of new sorts in
the approach of [27,11] can be explained as the construction of logics for the
composition of two signature functors.
9The next proposition shows that the constructions in De¯nition 10 indeed give
rise to syntax constructors:
Proposition 12 S1­S2, S1©S2, S1¯E and S1S2 are syntax constructors.
PROOF. It is clear that all four constructions are inclusion-preserving and
functorial. The fact that they are !-accessible is immediate from the fact that
accessibility is preserved under arbitrary coproducts and functor composition
in Set, and from the accessibility of M.
In ordinary modal logic, the modal language L = L(Sf2g) can be viewed as the
strati¯cation L =
S
n2!
Ln, where Ln contains all modal formulas of rank · n.
A similar characterisation holds for the language associated with an arbitrary
syntax constructor. This, in particular, will allow us to use induction on the
rank of formulas as a proof principle.
De¯nition 13 Suppose S is a syntax constructor. Let L0(S) = M;, and
Ln+1(S) = (M ±S)(Ln(S)) for n 2 !. If ' 2 Ln(S), we say that ' has rank at
most n.
If S = SM for a set M of modal operators, then Ln(S) contains all modal
formulas with modal operators in M whose nesting depth of modal operators
is at most n.
The fact that Ln(S) for n 2 ! constitute a strati¯cation of L(S) is the content
of the next result.
Proposition 14 The following hold:
(1) Ln(S) µ Ln+1(S) for all n 2 !;
(2) L(S) =
S
n2!
Ln(S).
PROOF. While the inclusion in the ¯rst of the above statements might ini-
tially appear slightly surprising, it should be noted that the application of M
introduces the constant truth values ® and tt (as ® ! ®), and as a result,
Ln(S) also contains formulas of rank strictly smaller than n.
Induction on n and the preservation of inclusions by S and M are used to prove
both the ¯rst statement and the inclusion
S
n2!
Ln(S) µ L(S). The inclusion
L(S) µ
S
n2!
Ln(S) follows by induction on the structure of formulas: First, ® 2
L0(S) µ
S
n2!
Ln(S). Second, if ';Ã 2
S
n2!
Ln(S), and hence ';Ã 2 Ln(S) for
some n 2 !, then closure of Ln(S) under boolean connectives gives ' ! Ã 2
10Ln(S) µ
S
n2!
Ln(S). Finally, if ' 2 S(
S
n2!
Ln(S)), then by !-accessibility of
S, ' 2 S(©) for some ¯nite set © µ
S
n2!
Ln(S). Now © ¯nite together with
Ln(S) µ Ln+1(S) give © µ Ln(S) for some n 2 !. Then, ' 2 S© implies ' 2
SLn(S) (as S preserves inclusions), and therefore ' 2 MSLn(S) = Ln+1(S) µ
S
n2!
Ln(S). This concludes the proof of L(S) µ
S
n2!
Ln(S).
Corollary 15 (M ± S)(L(S)) = L(S).
PROOF. The de¯nition of L(S) gives (M±S)(L(S)) µ L(S), while the second
statement of Proposition 14 combined with induction on n prove the reverse
inclusion.
For the subsequent development, it will be useful to regard the languages
Ln(S) as closures under boolean connectives of certain sets (of atoms).
De¯nition 16 The sets An(S) of atoms of rank n, with n 2 !, are de¯ned
by:
² A0(S) = ;;
² An+1(S) = (S ± M)(An(S)) for n 2 !.
Some of the properties of the sets An(S) are given next.
Proposition 17 The following hold:
(1) MAn(S) = Ln(S) for all n 2 !;
(2) An(S) µ An+1(S) for all n 2 !;
(3) Let A(S) =
S
n2!
An(S). Then S(L(S)) = A(S) and L(S) = M(A(S)).
PROOF. The ¯rst two statements follow by induction on n. For the third
statement, the !-accessibility of S together with Proposition 14 and the def-
inition of A(S) are used to prove S(L(S)) µ A(S), while induction on n,
the preservation of inclusions by S and M, and Corollary 15 prove the re-
verse inclusion. A subsequent application of M and use of Corollary 15 yields
L(S) = M(A(S)).
4 Modular Construction of Coalgebraic Semantics
In the previous section, we have argued that a syntax constructor with as-
sociated language L speci¯es those features which have to be added to the
11propositional language in order to obtain L. In standard modal logic, this
boils down to adding the modal operator 2, which can be used to describe the
observable behaviour after one transition step. Abstracting from this exam-
ple, we now introduce the one-step semantics for a syntax constructor, which
relates the additional modal structure (speci¯ed by a syntax constructor) to
the observations (speci¯ed by a signature functor) which can be made of a
system in one transition step. Throughout this section, S denotes a syntax
constructor and T is an endofunctor. Also, we write ^ P : Set
op ! Set for the
contravariant powerset functor. To simplify notation, we make no distinction
between (elements of) the set ^ PX and (elements of) the set PX.
De¯nition 18 (One-step semantics) If L is a set (of formulas) and X is a
set (of points), then an interpretation of L over X is a function d : L ! PX.
A morphism between interpretations d : L ! PX and d0 : L0 ! PX0 is a pair
(t;f) with t : L ! L0 and f : X0 ! X, such that d0 ± t = ^ Pf ± d:
L
t //
d
²²
L0
d0
²²
PX
^ Pf //PX0
A one-step semantics [[S]]T for a syntax constructor S w.r.t. an endofunctor
T maps interpretations of L over X to interpretations of SL over TX, in
such a way that whenever (t;f) : d ! d0 is a morphism of interpretations,
so is (St;Tf) : [[S]]T(d) ! [[S]]T(d0). We omit the superscript on the one-step
semantics if the endofunctor T is clear from the context.
A one-step semantics provides the glue between a language constructor S and
a signature functor T. The requirement that [[S]]T preserves morphisms of in-
terpretations ensures that [[S]]T is de¯ned uniformly on interpretations. This
will subsequently guarantee that the coalgebraic semantics of the induced lan-
guage L(S) is adequate w.r.t. behavioural equivalence, i.e. that behaviourally
equivalent states of coalgebras cannot be distinguished using formulas of the
language.
Remark 19 Let Int be the category whose objects are interpretations and
whose arrows are morphisms between interpretations. (That is, Int is the comma
category Id # 2{ .) Also, let V : Int ! Set (W : Int ! Set
op) take d : L ! PX
to L (respectively X), and (t;f) to t (respectively f). A one-step semantics
for S w.r.t. T can alternatively be de¯ned as a functor [[S]]T : Int ! Int such
12that V ± [[S]]T = S ± V and W ± [[S]]T = T op ± W:
Set
S //Set
Int
[[S]]T
//
W
²²
V
OO
Int
W
²²
V
OO
Set
op
Top //Set
op
Equivalently, if one regards the category Int as a ¯bred span [12, Section 9.1]
over the categories Set and Set
op
, a one-step semantics for S w.r.t. T can be
de¯ned as a lifting [[S]]T of S £ T
op to such spans:
Int
[[S]]T
//
hV;Wi
²²
Int
hV;Wi
²²
Set £ Set
op
S£T
op //Set £ Set
op
Lemma 20 There is a one-to-one correspondence between one-step semantics
[[S]]T for S w.r.t. T and natural transformations ± : S ^ P ) ^ PT.
PROOF. Given a one-step semantics [[S]]T for S w.r.t. T, one can de¯ne a
natural transformation ± : S ^ P ) ^ PT by letting ±C = [[S]]T(1PC) for each set
C. The naturality of ± follows from the functoriality of [[S]]T. Conversely, given
± : S ^ P ) ^ PT, one can de¯ne [[S]]T : Int ! Int by [[S]]T(d) = ±X ± Sd for
d : L ! PX. The functoriality of [[S]]T follows from the functoriality of S and
the naturality of ±. Moreover, the two mappings de¯ned above are inverse to
each other.
The previous correspondence establishes a connection with the work on duali-
ties between categories of algebras and coalgebras, see e.g. [18], where natural
transformations of the same kind are used to provide coalgebraic semantics
for modal languages.
Now recall that, for a set A, MA gives the closure of A under propositional
connectives. Then, interpretations d : A ! PX extend naturally to interpre-
tations d] : MA ! PX (by mapping ® to ; and ' ! Ã to (Xnd]('))[d](Ã)).
Also, a one-step semantics [[S]]T for S w.r.t. T extends to a one-step semantics
[[S±M]]T for S±M w.r.t. T, which maps an interpretation d : A ! PX to the
interpretation [[S]]T(d]) : SMA ! PTX. This corresponds to an extension of
the natural transformation ± : S ^ P ) ^ PT from Lemma 20 to a natural trans-
formation ±] : SM ^ P ) ^ PT, with ±] being given by ± ± Sº; here, the natural
13transformation º : M ^ P ! ^ P encodes the standard interpretation of boolean
operators on subsets.
A variant of the notion of one-step semantics was introduced in [5,6]. For
languages with unary modalities, a one-step semantics essentially corresponds
to a choice of a predicate lifting for each modal operator; languages and proof
systems arising in this way were previously studied in [24,25].
The key feature of a one-step semantics for a syntax constructor is that it
gives rise to a semantics of L(S) w.r.t. T-coalgebras, that is, it induces a
satisfaction relation between T-coalgebras and formulas of L(S). Furthermore,
we can de¯ne a one-step semantics for a combination of syntax constructors in
terms of some given one-step semantics for the ingredients. Before describing
these constructions, we provide one-step semantics for some simple syntax
constructors.
Example 21 We consider the syntax constructors introduced in Example 9.
(1) Suppose D is a set. The function which maps an arbitrary interpreta-
tion to the interpretation dD : D ! PD, x 7! fxg de¯nes a one-step
semantics for SD w.r.t. the constant functor TX = D.
(2) A one-step semantics for SId w.r.t. Id is given by
[[SId]](d) : SIdL ! PX [[SId]](d)(±') = fx 2 X j x 2 d(')g
for d : L ! PX and ' 2 L.
(3) A one-step semantics for SP w.r.t. P is de¯ned by
[[SP]](d) : SPL ! PPX [[SP]](d)(2') = fx µ X j x µ d(')g
for d : L ! PX and ' 2 L. Similarly, a one-step semantics for SP!
w.r.t. P! is given by the same formula, with slightly di®erent types:
[[SP!]](d) : SP!L ! PP!X [[SP!]](d)(2') = fx µ X j x ¯nite, x µ d(')g
where again d : L ! PX and ' 2 L.
(4) For the syntax constructor SD associated with the probability distribution
functor D, we de¯ne a one-step semantics by
[[SD]](d) : SDL ! PDX [[SD]](d)(Lp') = f¹ 2 DX j
X
x2d(')
¹(x) ¸ pg
for d : L ! PX and ' 2 L.
(5) If T is !-accessible and preserves inclusions and weak pullbacks, a one-
step semantics for the syntax constructor S = T associated with Moss's
coalgebraic logic is de¯ned by
[[S]](d) : SL ! PTX [[S]](d)(©) = fx 2 TX j x(T j=d)©g
14for d : L ! PX and © 2 TL, where the relation j=d µ X £L is given by
x j=d ' i® x 2 d('), and x(T j=d)© i® there exists r 2 (T j=d) such
that T¼1(r) = x and T¼2(r) = © as described in Section 2.
We now return to the claim made at the beginning of this section, and show
that a one-step semantics for a syntax constructor S w.r.t. a signature func-
tor T gives rise to an interpretation of the associated language L(S) over
T-coalgebras.
De¯nition 22 (Coalgebraic semantics) Suppose S is a syntax constructor
with one-step semantics [[S]]T and (C;°) 2 CoAlg(T). The coalgebraic seman-
tics [[']] = [[']]C µ C of a formula ' 2 L(S) w.r.t. a T-coalgebra (C;°) is
de¯ned inductively on the structure of formulas by
[[®]] = ; [[' ! Ã]] = (C n [[']]) [ [[Ã]]
[[¾]] = ^ P°([[S]]
T(d©)(¾)) for ¾ 2 S©
where we inductively assume that [[']] is already de¯ned for ' 2 © via the
map d© : © ! PC. Given c 2 C, we write (C;°;c) j= ' for c 2 [[']]C,
and Th(c) = f' 2 L(S) j (C;°;c) j= 'g. Finally, we write (C;°) j= ' if
(C;°;c) j= ' for all c 2 C, and j=T ' if (C;°) j= ' for all (C;°) 2 CoAlg(T).
Before showing that this de¯nition captures the standard interpretation of
some known modal logics, we need to show that the coalgebraic semantics is
well-de¯ned, as we can have ¾ 2 S© and ¾ 2 Sª for two di®erent sets ©;ª.
Lemma 23 The coalgebraic semantics of L(S) is well de¯ned, that is, for
(C;°) 2 CoAlg(T) and ©;ª µ L(S), we have [[S]]T(d©)(¾) = [[S]]T(dª)(¾) for
all ¾ 2 S© \ Sª.
PROOF. The claim follows from the de¯nition of a one-step semantics by
considering the diagram
S©
[[S]]T(d©)
²²
Si //S(© [ ª)
[[S]]T(d©[ª)
²²
Sª
Sj oo
[[S]]T(dÃ)
²²
P(TC) P(TC) P(TC)
where i : © ! © [ ª and j : ª ! © [ ª are the inclusions.
Our de¯nition of the coalgebraic semantics generalises the semantics of modal
formulas, as well as the semantics of the formulas considered in [10] and [21]:
15Example 24 (1) Consider the syntax constructor SP de¯ned in Example 9,
and the associated semantics [[SP]] as in Example 21. The induced coal-
gebraic semantics w.r.t. (C;°) is de¯ned inductively by
(C;°;c) j= 2' i® (C;°;c
0) j= ' for all c
0 2 °(c)
with c 2 C and ' 2 L(SP). This is the standard textbook semantics of
modal logic [4].
(2) Consider the syntax constructor SD de¯ned in Example 9, and the associ-
ated semantics [[SD]] as in Example 21. The induced coalgebraic semantics
w.r.t. (C;°) is de¯ned inductively by
(C;°;c) j= Lp' i®
X
(C;°;c0)j='
°(c)(c
0) ¸ p
with c 2 C, ' 2 L(SD) and p 2 Q \ [0;1]. Note that this agrees with the
semantics of the probabilistic modal logic of [10].
(3) Consider the syntax constructor S = T associated with Moss's coalgebraic
logic, and the corresponding semantics [[S]] as de¯ned in Example 21. The
induced coalgebraic semantics w.r.t. (C;°) is de¯ned inductively by
(C;°;c) j= ' i® °(c)(T j=C)'
with c 2 C and ' 2 T(L(S)) where the relation j=C µ C £ L(S) is given
by c j=C ' i® (C;°;c) j= '. This agrees with the standard semantics of
Moss's coalgebraic logic [21].
The above example shows that the coalgebraic semantics specialises to known
semantics in concrete cases. We now turn to the issue of combining one-step
semantics, and show that we can derive a one-step semantics for a combination
of syntax constructors (see De¯nition 10) by combining one-step semantics for
the ingredients. To make notation bearable, we disregard the dependency on
the signature functor.
De¯nition 25 (Combinations of one-step semantics) Let d1 : L1 ! PX1
and d2 : L2 ! PX2 be interpretations of L1 and L2 over X1 and X2, respec-
tively, let E be an arbitrary set, and consider the functions
d1 ­ d2 :L1 ­ L2 ! P(X1 £ X2); [¼i]' 7! f(x1;x2) j xi 2 di(')g
d1 © d2 :L1 © L2 ! P(X1 + X2); h·ii' 7! f¶i(xi) j xi 2 di(')g
d1 ¯ E :L1 ¯ E ! P(X
E); [e]' 7! ff : E ! X j f(e) 2 d1(')g:
If [[Si]] is a one-step semantics for a syntax constructor Si w.r.t. an endofunctor
Ti, for i = 1;2, the one-step semantics of various combinations of S1 and S2
16are de¯ned as follows:
[[S1 ­ S2]](d) = [[S1]](d)
] ­ [[S2]](d)
] : MS1L ­ MS2L ! P(T1 £ T2)X
[[S1 © S2]](d) = [[S1]](d)
] © [[S2]](d)
] : MS1L © MS2L ! P(T1 + T2)X
[[S1 ¯ E]](d) = [[S1]](d)
] ¯ E : (MS1L) ¯ E ! P(T1
E)X
[[S1  S2]](d) = [[S1]]([[S2]](d)
]) : S1MS2L ! PT1T2X
where d : L ! PX.
The intuitions behind the de¯nitions of d1 ­ d2, d1 © d2 and d1 ¯ E are as
follows. Assuming that formulas in L1 and L2 are interpreted over X1 and X2,
respectively, we can interpret formulas in L1 ­ L2 (L1 © L2) over X1 £ X2
(X1 + X2). In the ¯rst case, a formula [¼i]' holds in x = (x1;x2) i® '
holds in xi. Also, h·ii' holds in x 2 X1 + X2 i® x = ¶i(xi) and ' holds
in xi. Finally, d1 ¯ E interprets L1 ¯ E in the structure P(XE), where, for a
function f : E ! X, we have that f satis¯es [e]' i® f(e) satis¯es '.
Note that the presence of the ( )] operator in the de¯nitions of [[S1 ­ S2]],
[[S1 © S2]], [[S1 ¯ E]] and [[S1  S2]] ensures that the domains of [[S1 ­ S2]](d),
[[S1 © S2]](d), [[S1 ¯ E]](d) and [[S1  S2]](d) are as required.
We now show that the combination of one-step semantics is well-de¯ned.
Proposition 26 Suppose [[Si]] is a one-step semantics for Si w.r.t. Ti, for
i = 1;2. Then [[S1 ­ S2]], [[S1 © S2]], [[S1 ¯ E]] and [[S1  S2]] are one-step
semantics for S1 ­S2, S1 ©S2, S1¯E and S1 S2 w.r.t. T1 £T2, T1 +T2, T1
E
and T1 ± T2, respectively.
PROOF. Straightforward unfolding of the respective de¯nitions.
We have now seen how we can combine syntax constructors and their asso-
ciated one-step semantics. This gives rise to a modular way of constructing
logics for coalgebras. The following two sections present applications of this
modular approach. In the next section, we show that a combination of logics
has the Hennessy-Milner property if all the ingredients of the construction
satisfy an expressiveness property. In the subsequent section, we show how
to obtain sound and complete proof systems for a combination of logics, by
suitably combining sound and complete proof systems for the building blocks.
175 Behavioural versus Logical Equivalence
In this section, we investigate the Hennessy-Milner property, stating that any
two behaviourally equivalent points have the same logical theory, on logics
arising from syntax constructors and associated one-step semantics. We in-
troduce the notion of expressiveness for an interpretation, and show that if a
one-step semantics for a syntax constructor preserves expressiveness, then the
induced logic has the Hennessy-Milner property. To treat logics which arise
from a combination of syntax constructors and associated one-step semantics,
we show that a combination of one-step semantics preserves expressiveness if
all the ingredients do. This allows us to establish the Hennessy-Milner property
for combined logics in a modular fashion.
We begin with the easy part, and show that behaviourally equivalent states
cannot be distinguished by formulas of a logic induced by a syntax constructor
and associated one-step semantics.
Proposition 27 Suppose S is a syntax constructor, [[S]]T is a one-step se-
mantics for S w.r.t. an endofunctor T, and (C;°);(D;±) 2 CoAlg(T). Then,
Th(c) = Th(d) whenever c ' d, with c 2 C and d 2 D.
PROOF. If c ' d, then there exist T-coalgebra morphisms f : (C;°) !
(E;²) and g : (D;±) ! (E;²) such that f(c) = g(d). Thus, to show that
Th(c) = Th(d), it su±ces to show that Th(c) = Th(f(c)) for any f : (C;°) !
(E;²), or equivalently,
(C;°;c) j= ' i® (E;²;f(c)) j= '
for any ' 2 L(S) and f as above. The last statement follows by induction on
the structure of formulas, using De¯nition 22 and the functoriality of [[S]]T.
The remainder of this section is concerned with proving the converse of Propo-
sition 27. To this end, we introduce the notion of one-step expressiveness,
which will allow us to derive the Hennessy-Milner property for a logic induced
by a syntax constructor and associated one-step semantics. Moreover, we show
that this condition automatically holds for a combination of syntax construc-
tors and associated one-step semantics, if it holds for the ingredients of the
construction.
The formal de¯nition of one-step expressiveness is as follows:
De¯nition 28 (One-step expressiveness) (1) An interpretation d : L !
PX is expressive if the map dy : X ! PL given by x 7! f' 2 L j x 2
d(')g is injective.
18(2) A one-step semantics [[S]]T is one-step expressive if [[S]]T(d]) : SMA !
PTX is expressive whenever d : A ! PX is.
The idea behind the notion of expressive interpretation is the following: if
d : L ! PX is expressive, then the set fd(') j ' 2 Lg contains enough pred-
icates to distinguish individual elements of X. Thinking of the set Th(x) =
f' 2 L j x 2 d(')g as the theory of the point x 2 X, then d is expressive if
Th(x) = Th(x0) implies x = x0 for all x;x0 2 X. Now recall that the language
induced by a syntax constructor S is generated by the iterated application of
the functor S±M, to an empty set of atoms to begin with (De¯nitions 13 and
16, and Propositions 14 and 17). Thus, our concern is the preservation of ex-
pressiveness at each step. The notion of one-step expressiveness of a one-step
semantics ensures that this is the case. (Recall that d] : MA ! PX de-
notes the natural extension of an interpretation d : A ! PX to propositional
formulas over A.)
Given the correspondence between one-step semantics [[S]]T for S w.r.t. T and
natural transformations ± : S ^ P ) ^ PT, one can give an alternative character-
isation of the one-step expressiveness of [[S]]T in terms of ±. To see this, let
´ : Id ) ^ P ± ^ P denote the unit of the adjunction ^ P ` ^ P, mapping x 2 X
to fY µ X j x 2 Y g, and let ½ ::= ^ PSM´ ± ^ P±
]
^ P ± ´T ^ P : T ^ P ) ^ PSM. Also,
note that for an interpretation d : L ! PX, the map dy : X ! PL from
De¯nition 28 is the unique such map with the property that d = ^ Pdy ±´L and
dy = ^ Pd ± ´X.
The natural transformation ½ embodies the interpretation of the language
given by a syntax constructor, and has been used by Klin [15] in a category-
theoretic setting, where the functor M is absorbed into the structure of the
category on top of which the logic is de¯ned.
Proposition 29 Under the assumption that T preserves monomorphims, a
one-step semantics [[S]]T for S w.r.t. T is one-step expressive if and only if all
the components of the natural transformation ½ are monomorphisms.
PROOF. We use the correspondence between one-step semantics [[S]]T for T
and natural transformations ± : S ^ P ! ^ PT given in Lemma 20, and denote
the inductively-de¯ned interpretation of boolean operators over a set X by
ºX : M ^ PX ! ^ P(X); note that º is natural.
Assume ¯rst that all the components of ½ are monomorphisms. To show one-
step expressiveness of [[S]]T, let d : A ! PX be an expressive interpretation.
We have: ([[S]]T(d]))y = ^ P[[S]]T(d]) ± ´TX = ^ PSd] ± ^ P±X ± ´TX = ^ PSMd ±
^ PSºX ± ^ P±X ±´TX = ^ PSMd± ^ P±
]
X ±´TX = ^ PSM´A ± ^ PSM ^ Pdy ± ^ P±
]
X ±´TX =
^ PSM´A± ^ P±
]
^ PA± ^ P2Tdy±´TX = ^ PSM´A± ^ P±
]
^ PA±´T ^ PA±Tdy = ½A±Tdy using
19the naturality of ±] and ´. Now expressiveness of d together with preservation
of monomorphisms by T result in Tdy being a monomorphism, which, together
with ½A being a monomorphism, result in ([[S]]T(d]))y also being mono. Hence,
[[S]]T is one-step expressive.
Assume now that [[S]]T is one-step expressive. To show that ½A : T ^ PA )
^ PSMA is a monomorphism, consider the interpretation ´A : A ! PPA.
Since ´
y
A = 1PA is a monomorphism, one-step expressiveness of [[S]]T results in
[[S]]T(´
]
A)y also being a monomorphism. But [[S]]T(´
]
A)y = ([[S]]T(1P2A)±S´
]
A)y =
^ P([[S]]T(1P2A)±S´
]
A)±´T ^ PA = ^ PS´
]
A± ^ P[[S]]T(1P2A)±´T ^ PA = ^ PSM´A± ^ PSº ^ PA±
^ P± ^ PA ± ´T ^ PA = ^ PSM´A ± ^ P±
]
^ PA ± ´T ^ PA = ½A. Hence, ½A is a monomorphism.
This concludes the proof.
In what follows, we will refer to a one-step expressive one-step semantics sim-
ply as an expressive one-step semantics. Using this terminology, our ¯rst main
result can be stated as follows:
Theorem 30 If [[S]]T is an expressive one-step semantics, then L(S) is ex-
pressive w.r.t. '!, that is, Th(c) = Th(d) i® c '! d, for all (C;°), (D;±) 2
CoAlg(T) and (c;d) 2 C £ D.
In other words, the induced logic is rich enough to distinguish any two states
which exhibit di®erent behaviours in ¯nitely many steps.
The proof of this theorem uses induction on the rank of formulas (see Def-
inition 13). We begin by showing that a formula of rank at most n can be
semantically represented by a subset of T n1. This representation is computed
by the functions dn, which we now introduce.
De¯nition 31 For n 2 !, the functions dn : An(S) ! PT n1 with n 2 ! are
de¯ned inductively by
² d0 : ; ! P1 is the unique such map, and
² dn+1 = [[S]](d]
n) for n 2 !.
The relationship between the coalgebraic semantics of a formula ' 2 Ln(S)
and the semantical representation d]
n(') is as follows:
Proposition 32 ([25, Lemma 4.10]) Let (C;°) be a T-coalgebra and ' 2
Ln(S). Then
c 2 [[']]C i® °n(c) 2 d
]
n(')
where the functions °n : C ! T n1 with n 2 ! are as in De¯nition 4.
PROOF. Induction on n.
20Using this terminology, the proof of Theorem 30 can be given as follows:
PROOF. Assume that (C;°);(D;±) 2 CoAlg(T), and c 2 C and d 2 D
have the same logical theory, that is, (C;°;c) j= ' i® (D;±;d) j= ' for all
' 2 L(S). We have to show that °n(c) = ±n(d) for all n 2 !. This will
follow from Proposition 32, if we show that dn
y : T n1 ! P(Ln(S)) is injective
for all n 2 !. For n = 0, this is immediate. For n > 0, this follows from
dn = [[S]](d
]
n¡1) using the one-step expressiveness of [[S]].
Using the fact that !-behavioural equivalence coincides with behavioural equiv-
alence for coalgebras of a functor whose ¯nal sequence stabilises in at most
! + ! steps (see Remark 5), we have the following corollary:
Corollary 33 Suppose the ¯nal sequence of T stabilises in at most !+! steps
and [[S]]T is one-step expressive. Then L(S) is expressive, that is, Th(c) =
Th(d) i® c ' d, for all (C;°), (D;±) 2 CoAlg(T) and (c;d) 2 C £ D.
Note that the accessibility degree of T basically limits the branching degree
of T-coalgebras [25], so the above corollary is a coalgebraic Hennessy-Milner
result.
It is easy to see that the one-step semantics for all the basic syntax constructors
are one-step expressive:
Example 34 (1) Suppose D is a set. Then [[SD]] is one-step expressive, since
the interpretation dD : D ! PD, x 7! fxg is expressive.
(2) [[SId]] is one-step expressive. For, if d : A ! PX is an expressive in-
terpretation, and if the formula ' 2 A µ MA distinguishes two points
x 6= y 2 X (under the interpretation provided by d), then the formula
±' 2 SIdMA also distinguishes these two points (this time under the
interpretation provided by [[SId]](d])).
(3) [[SP!]] is one-step expressive. To see this, let d : A ! PX be an expressive
interpretation, and let Y;Z 2 P!X be such that Y 6= Z. Say ; 6= (Y nZ) 3
y. The expressiveness of d together with MA being closed under negation
yields, for each z 2 Z, a formula 'z 2 MA such that z j=d] 'z and
y 6j=d] 'z. Then, the formula 2
W
z2Z 'z 2 SP!MA holds in Z but not in
Y . Hence, [[SP!]](d]) : SP!MA ! P(P!X) is expressive. We also note
that one-step expressiveness does not hold for the unbounded powerset
functor. This observation is consistent with the fact that Hennessy-Milner
logic only characterises bisimulation on image-¯nite transition systems.
(4) [[SD]] is one-step expressive. To see this, let d : A ! PX be an expressive
interpretation, let ¹;º 2 DX be such that ¹ 6= º, and let dom(¹) [
dom(º) = fx1;:::;xng. Since ¹ 6= º, there exists x 2 dom(¹) such that
¹(x) 6= º(x). We assume without loss of generality that x = x1 and
21¹(x1) > º(x1). The expressiveness of d together with MA being closed
under negation yields, for each i 2 f2;:::;ng, a formula 'i 2 MA such
that x1 j=d] 'i and xi 6j=d] 'i. Now if q 2 Q with º(x1) < q < ¹(x1), the
formula Lq
V
i=2;:::;n 'i 2 SDMA holds in ¹ but not in º. Hence, [[SD]](d]) :
SDMA ! P(DX) is expressive.
Alternatively, Proposition 29 can be used to derive the expressiveness of the
coalgebraic semantics above, using essentially the same arguments. As the one-
step semantics for all the basic syntax constructors are one-step expressive,
our next goal is to show that one-step expressiveness is preserved by all the
combinations of syntax constructors and associated one-step semantics. Again
suppressing the dependency on the signature functor, we obtain:
Proposition 35 Suppose [[S1]] and [[S2]] are expressive one-step semantics
w.r.t. T1 and T2, respectively. Then so are the one-step semantics [[S1 ­ S2]],
[[S1 © S2]], [[S1 ¯ E]] and [[S1  S2]] w.r.t. T1 £ T2, T1 + T2, T1
E and T1 ± T2,
respectively.
PROOF. In the case of [[S1  S2]], the claim follows immediately from the
de¯nition of [[S1  S2]] and from the one-step expressiveness of [[S1]] and [[S2]].
Now suppose that d : A ! PX is expressive; by our assumption, [[Si]](d]) :
SiMA ! P(TiX) are also expressive for i = 1;2. To see that [[S1 ­ S2]] is
expressive, assume (x1;x2);(y1;y2) 2 T1X £ T2X with (x1;x2) 6= (y1;y2).
Without loss of generality, assume that x1 6= y1. By expressiveness of [[S1]](d]),
we ¯nd ' 2 S1MA that distinguishes x1 and y1, i.e. x1 2 [[S1]](d])(') and
y1 = 2 [[S1]](d])('), or vice-versa. By construction of [[S1 ­ S2]], the formula
[¼1]' 2 (S1­S2)MA then distinguishes (x1;x2) from (y1;y2). We now turn to
the expressiveness of [[S1 ©S2]](d]). Clearly the formula h·1itt 2 (S1 ©S2)MA
distinguishes any x 2 ¶1(T1X) from any y 2 ¶2(T2X), whereas the formula
h·ii' 2 (S1 © S2)MA distinguishes x = ¶i(xi) from y = ¶i(yi) whenever ' 2
SiMA distinguishes xi from yi. Finally we show that [[S1 ¯ E]] is expressive.
Suppose that f;g 2 (T1
E)(X) with f 6= g, that is, f;g : E ! T1X with
f(e) 6= g(e) for some e 2 E. As [[S1]] is one-step expressive, we ¯nd ' 2 S1MA
that distinguishes f(e) from g(e), hence [e]' 2 (S1 ¯ E)MA distinguishes f
from g.
Thus, Theorem 30 applies to any combination of expressive one-step semantics.
As a result, the logic induced by a combination of syntax constructors with
associated expressive one-step semantics distinguishes any two states up to
!-behavioural equivalence, and in case the ¯nal sequence of T stabilises at, or
before !+!, also up to behavioural equivalence. As an immediate application,
we obtain expressive logics for all system types discussed in Example 2.
22In particular, for image-¯nite simple probabilistic automata, we obtain a vari-
ant of the logic described in [13] which is expressive w.r.t. behavioural equiv-
alence, and hence also w.r.t. the strong version of the notion of bisimulation
considered in loc.cit. (see also Example 7).
6 Modular Construction of Proof Systems
This section extends the methods presented so far to also include the compo-
sitional construction of proof systems. Our main result shows that this can be
done in such a way that the combined proof system inherits soundness and
completeness from its building blocks. The key notion needed to modularise
the construction of proof systems is that of a proof system constructor, which
operates on the category of boolean theories, described next.
De¯nition 36 The category BTh of boolean theories is speci¯ed by the fol-
lowing data:
² objects are pairs (A;©A) where A is a set (of atoms), and ©A µ MA is a
set (of theorems over A),
² morphisms f : (A;©A) ! (B;©B) are functions f : A ! B such that
' 2 ©A =) Mf(') 2 ©B.
We write ¦1 : BTh ! Set for the ¯rst projection functor.
It is easy to see that ¦1 is actually a ¯bration that arises by change of base
of the ¯bration Pred ! Set along the functor M [12], where Pred ! Set is
the standard ¯bration of subsets over sets. The fact that ¦1 is a ¯bration is
however inconsequential for the later development.
The idea behind an object (A;©A) is that ©A contains the set of all provable
formulas over atoms in A. Note that closure under propositional reasoning and
modus ponens is not required in general for boolean theories. However, there
is a canonical way of transforming an arbitrary boolean theory into one which
has the previously mentioned property. This is captured by the inclusion-
preserving functor Cl : BTh ! BTh which takes a boolean theory (A;©) to
the boolean theory (A;©0), with ©0 being obtained by adding all propositional
tautologies over A to ©, and closing the resulting set of formulas under modus
ponens. An immediate consequence of this de¯nition is that Cl ± Cl = Cl. The
boolean theories of interest in the following will be obtained by applying Cl
to certain sets of axioms.
Using the category BTh of boolean theories, we can now de¯ne the notion of
proof system constructor as follows.
23De¯nition 37 (Proof system constructor) Suppose S is a syntax construc-
tor. A proof system constructor for S is an inclusion-preserving, !-accessible
functor P : BTh ! BTh that satis¯es ¦1 ± P = S ± M ± ¦1.
Note that the above de¯nition has several implications. First, it requires that
P is compatible with S in the sense that the diagram
BTh
P //
¦1
²²
BTh
¦1
²²
Set M
//Set S
//Set
commutes, that is, P lifts S ± M. The presence of M ensures that the syntax
constructor is only applied to sets of formulas that are closed under boolean
connectives. Second, the requirement that P is !-accessible generalises a stan-
dard requirement in proof systems, namely that an inference rule can only
contain a ¯nite number of premises. Since P is !-accessible, and since every
BTh-object (A;©) is an !-directed union of objects (C;ª) with C and ª ¯-
nite, the value P(A;©) is determined by the values P(C;ª) with C a ¯nite
subset of A and ª a ¯nite subset of ©. That is, any ' 2 P(A;©) is constructed
using a ¯nite number of atoms C µ A, and is derived using a ¯nite number of
premises ª µ ©. The !-accessibility of a proof system constructor will later
be shown to ensure that the induced derivability predicate can be given an
inductive characterisation.
The intuition behind the de¯nition of a proof system constructor is as follows.
The syntax constructor S speci¯es a set of modalities to be added to the basic
propositional language. The functor S ± M takes a set A of atoms to the set
A0 obtained by applying the modal operators de¯ned by S to propositional
formulas over A exactly once. Now a corresponding proof system constructor
takes a set of theorems over A, which contains all provable facts among propo-
sitional formulas over A, and produces a set of axioms over A0. Subsequently
closing these axioms together with all propositional tautologies over A0 under
modus ponens yields a set of theorems over A0, which contains all provable
facts concerning the next transition step that can be derived from the given
theorems over A. In other words, a proof system constructor speci¯es how
theoremhood can be lifted to formulas containing an extra degree of nesting
of the modal operators. Note that proof system constructors only axiomatise
those judgements that are needed on top of propositional logic.
Since the axioms and rules of modal logic only involve formulas of rank at
most one, and since the premises of these rules only involve formulas of rank
zero, it is straightforward to encode the modal logic K into a proof system
constructor. A similar encoding can be given for the probabilistic modal logic
described in [10]. The next example describes these encodings, as well as other
proof system constructors that correspond to syntax constructors de¯ned in
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Example 38 (1) For the constant functor TX = D and the associated syn-
tax constructor SD, we de¯ne a constant proof system constructor PD by
PD(A;©) = (D;©0), where ' 2 ©0 µ MD i® `
0 ', and `
0 is de¯ned by
the following axioms:
`
0 _
d2D
d (only if D ¯nite) `
0 :(d ^ d
0) (d 6= d0 2 D)
(2) For the identity functor TX = X and the associated syntax constructor
SId, we de¯ne a proof system constructor PId by PId(A;©) = (SIdMA;©0),
where ' 2 ©0 µ MSIdMA i® `
0 ', and `
0 is de¯ned by the following ax-
ioms:
`
0 ±® ! ® `
0 ±(' ! Ã) $ (±' !±Ã)
` ' ! Ã
`
0 ±' !±Ã
with ';Ã 2 MA, where we write ` ' for ' 2 ©. Note that, while the
last axiom above is written as an inference rule, it actually represents an
axiom schema giving an axiom of form `
0 ±' ! ±Ã for any theorem
' ! Ã 2 ©.
(3) Consider the syntax constructors SP and SP! from Example 9. For a
boolean theory (A;©), de¯ne PP(A;©) = PP!(A;©) = (SPMA;©0) where
' 2 ©0 µ MSPMA i® `
0 ', and `
0 is de¯ned by the following axioms:
`
0 2tt `
0 2' ^ 2Ã ! 2(' ^ Ã)
` ' ! Ã
`
0 2' ! 2Ã
Then, PP (PP!) is a proof system constructor for SP (respectively SP!).
(4) Consider the syntax constructor SD from Example 9. For p 2 Q \ [0;1]
and ' 2 A, let Mp' ::= L1¡p:' 2 MSDMA, and Ep' := Lp' ^ Mp' 2
MSDMA. Recall that Lp signi¯es \with probability at least p"; accordingly
Mp stands for \probability at most p", while Ep stands for \probability
exactly p". Thus, given the one-step semantics [[SD]] of Example 21, we
have
[[SD]](d
])(Mp') = f¹ 2 DX j
X
x2d](')
¹(x) · pg
[[SD]](d
])(Ep') = f¹ 2 DX j
X
x2d](')
¹(x) = pg
for d : A ! PX and ' 2 MA. Now given a ¯nite sequence of formulas
'1;:::;'m 2 MA, let '(k) stand for
W
1·l1<:::<lk·m('l1 ^ ::: ^ 'lk); in
particular, '(k) = ® if k > m. Thus, the formula '(k) states that, from
among the formulas '1;:::;'m, at least k are true at any point in X.
Next, for each boolean theory (A;©), de¯ne PD(A;©) = (SDMA;©0),
where ' 2 ©0 µ MSDMA i® `
0 ', and `
0 is de¯ned by the following
25axioms:
`
0 L0' `
0 Lptt `
0 Lp' ! :Lq:' `
0 :Lp' ! Mp'
`
Vmax(m;n)
k=1 '(k) $ Ã(k)
`
0 (
Vm
i=1 Lpi'i) ^ (
Vn
j=2 MqiÃi) ! Lp1+:::+pm¡(q2+:::+qn)Ã1
with p + q > 1 being required in the third axiom.
All but the last of the above axioms capture immediate properties of
the one-step semantics [[SD]] de¯ned in Example 21. The last axiom ex-
ploits the well-de¯nedness of integrals w.r.t. probability distributions. To
see this, assume that the formulas '1;:::;'m;Ã1;:::;Ãn 2 MA are in-
terpreted using d : A ! PX, and let d]('i) = Ei for i = 1;:::;m and
d](Ãj) = Fj for j = 1;:::;n. Then, the \premise" of the last axiom holds
precisely when the sum of the characteristic functions of E1;:::;Em coin-
cides with the sum of the characteristic functions of F1;:::;Fn. Whenever
this is the case, if ¹ : X ! [0;1] is a probability distribution, we also have
that
m P
i=1
¹(Ei) =
n P
j=1
¹(Fj). This equality is further exploited in the \con-
clusion" of this axiom: whenever ¹(Ei) ¸ pi for i = 1;:::;m and ¹(Fj) ·
qj for j = 2;:::;n, then necessarily ¹(F1) ¸ p1+:::+pm¡(q2+:::+qn).
The functor PD : BTh ! BTh de¯ned above quali¯es as a proof system
constructor for SD.
We conclude this example by noting that a standard proof system con-
sisting of the axioms and rules in the de¯nition of PD (with `
0 replaced
by `) together with the rule:
` ' $ Ã
` Lp' $ LpÃ
has been studied in [10]. We note, however, that by taking m = n = 1 in
the last axiom de¯ning PD, one obtains both of the following:
` ' $ Ã
`
0 Lp' ! LpÃ
` ' $ Ã
`
0 LpÃ ! Lp'
and therefore the additional rule used in [10] is redundant.
The previous example explains our choice of terminology as regards proof sys-
tem constructors. Each of the proof system constructors in Example 38 gives
rise to a standard proof system for the language induced by the corresponding
syntax constructor. For example, replacing the symbol `
0 by ` in the axioms
de¯ning the proof system constructor PP for SP yields a set of axioms and
rules for standard modal logic.
Now recall that the language L(S) induced by a syntax constructor S was
de¯ned as the smallest set of formulas which is closed under the application
26of S, as well as under propositional connectives. Similarly, a proof system
constructor P for S induces a derivability predicate on the language L(S),
de¯ned as the set of facts that can be inferred by applying P together with
propositional reasoning and modus ponens.
De¯nition 39 (Theory induced by P) The theory induced by P, denoted
(A(S);©P), is the least boolean theory of the form (A(S);©) with the following
properties:
² Cl(A(S);©) µ (A(S);©), and
² P(A(S);©) µ (A(S);©).
We write `P ' for ' 2 ©P.
Equivalently, (A(S);©P) can be characterised as the least boolean theory of
the form (A(S);©) which satis¯es
² (A(S);©) contains all instances of propositional tautologies,
² (A(S);©) is closed under modus ponens,
² P(A;ª) µ (A(S);©) for any (A;ª) µ (A(S);©) with A and ª ¯nite.
Note that, since P lifts S ± M, we have (¦1 ± P)(A(S);©P) = (S ± M ±
¦1)(A(S);©P) = (S ± M)(A(S)) = S(L(S)) = A(S), and therefore the the-
ory induced by P is well-typed.
We now apply our main programme also to this de¯nition, and show that
the theory induced by P can be viewed as the strati¯cation of a sequence
of boolean theories ©n
P µ Ln(S). This will open the road for the proof of
soundness and completeness, where induction on the rank of formulas will be
available as a proof technique.
De¯nition 40 The boolean theories (An(S);©n
P) with n 2 ! are de¯ned by:
² (A0(S);©0
P) = Cl(;;;);
² (An+1(S);©
n+1
P ) = (Cl ± P)(An(S);©n
P) for n 2 !.
We write `
n
P ' for ' 2 ©n
P, with n 2 !.
Note that, since ¦1 ± Cl = ¦1 and ¦1 ± P = S ± M ± ¦1, we have (¦1 ±
Cl ± P)(An(S);©n
P) = (¦1 ± P)(An(S);©n
P) = (S ± M ± ¦1)(An(S);©n
P) =
(S ± M)(An(S)) = An+1(S) for all n 2 !, and therefore the boolean theo-
ries (An(S);©n
P) with n 2 ! are well-typed. Moreover, the following holds:
Proposition 41 For n 2 !, (An(S);©n
P) µ (An+1(S);©
n+1
P ).
27PROOF. Induction on n, using the fact that both Cl and P preserve inclu-
sions.
We are now ready to give an inductive characterisation of the theory induced
by P.
Proposition 42 The boolean theories (A(S);©P) and
S
n2!
(An(S);©n
P) coin-
cide.
PROOF. Induction on n proves (An(S);©n
P) µ (A(S);©P) for all n 2 !,
which then yields
S
n2!
(An(S);©n
P) µ (A(S);©P). The reverse inclusion follows
by structural induction over ©P: First, any ' 2 ©P which is an instance of a
propositional tautology belongs to some Ln(S) = MAn(S), and hence to ©n
P.
Second, if ' and ' ! Ã are in ©P, and by the induction hypothesis, also in
©n
P for some n 2 !, then closure of ©n
P under modus ponens gives Ã 2 ©n
P.
Finally, suppose that ' 2 P(A(S);©P). By !-accessibility of P, we can assume
that ' 2 P(A;ª) for some (A;ª) µ (A(S);©P), with A and ª ¯nite. By
the induction hypothesis, there exists n 2 ! such that (A;ª) µ (An(S);©n
P).
Hence, ' 2 P(A;ª) µ P(An(S);©n
P) µ Cl(P(An(S);©n
P)) = (An+1(S);©
n+1
P ) µ
S
n2!
(An(S);©n
P). This concludes the proof.
As a result of Proposition 42, we can use induction on n to prove proper-
ties of (A(S);`P). In the following, we consider soundness and completeness
of (A(S);`P) w.r.t. the coalgebraic semantics induced by a one-step seman-
tics [[S]]T for S, and show that these follow from soundness and completeness
conditions involving [[S]]T and P.
De¯nition 43 (One-step soundness and completeness) A boolean the-
ory (A;`) is sound (complete) w.r.t. an interpretation d : A ! PX if ` '
implies d](') = X (respectively d](') = X implies ` ') for any ' 2 MA.
A proof system constructor P for S is one-step sound (one-step complete)
w.r.t. a one-step semantics [[S]]T if (Cl ± P)(A;`) is sound (respectively com-
plete) w.r.t. [[S]]
T(d]) : SMA ! PTX whenever (A;`) is sound (complete)
w.r.t. d : A ! PX.
Using induction, we can derive soundness and weak completeness in the stan-
dard way from their one-step counterparts; due to the lack of compactness,
our logics usually fail to be strongly complete.
Theorem 44 (Soundness and completeness) If the proof system construc-
tor P for S is one-step sound (complete) w.r.t. [[S]]T, then (A(S);`P) is sound
28(respectively complete) w.r.t. the coalgebraic semantics of L(S), that is, j=T '
if (only if) `P ' for all ' 2 L(S).
PROOF. We assume that T1 6= ;, as otherwise TX = ; for all X 2 Set,
and the claim is trivial. If the functions dn : An(S) ! PT n1 with n 2 !
are as in De¯nition 31, then it follows by induction on n that `
n
P is sound
(complete) w.r.t. dn for n 2 !. Now soundness (completeness) of (A(S);`P)
w.r.t. the coalgebraic semantics of L(S) amounts to `P ' implies [[']]C = C
for any T-coalgebra (C;°) (respectively [[']]C = C for any T-coalgebra (C;°)
implies `P '). Moreover, if ' 2 Ln(S), then by Proposition 32, [[']]C = C is
equivalent to ^ P°n(d]
n(')) = C. Thus, assuming that P is one-step sound, it
follows that (A(S);`) =
S
n2!
(An(S);`
n
P) is sound w.r.t. the coalgebraic seman-
tics of L(S). Now assume that P is one-step complete, and let ' 2 Ln(S)
be such that [[']]C = C for any T-coalgebra (C;°). Consider the coalge-
bra (C;°) = (T n1;T ni), where i : 1 ! T1 is chosen arbitrarily. Then,
(T ni)n = idTn1 : T n1 ! T n1. The fact [[']]C = C now gives d]
n(') = T n1,
and hence, using the completeness of `
n
P w.r.t. dn, `
n
P '. Thus, `P ', which
concludes the proof.
In the case of standard modal logic, the axioms and rules given in Example 38
(with `
0 replaced by `) together with all instances of propositional tautologies
and the modus ponens and uniform substitution rules, form a sound and com-
plete proof system. Similarly, for probabilistic transition systems, the axioms
and rules given in Example 38 yield a sound and complete proof system: this
was proved in [10] using the standard ¯ltration method. However, these results
are of limited usefulness here, since in order to be able to derive soundness and
completeness results for more complex signature functors, de¯ned in terms of
P and D, we must prove that the proof system constructors PP and PD are
one-step sound and complete.
We now establish one-step soundness and completeness for all the proof sys-
tem constructors introduced in Example 38. Together with the fact that the
combination of proof system constructors preserves one-step soundness and
completeness (which we will establish later), this puts us in the position to
apply our modular techniques to a large class of probabilistic system types,
including probabilistic transition systems and probabilistic automata.
We begin with a simple technical lemma; recall that a disjunctive clause over
a set A of atoms is a formula of the form a1 _¢¢¢ _ am _:a0
1 _¢¢¢ _ :a0
n with
m;n ¸ 0 and a1;:::;am;:::;a0
1;:::;a0
n 2 A.
Lemma 45 Suppose (A;©A) 2 BTh and let (A;`) = Cl(A;©A). If d : A !
PX is an interpretation, the following are equivalent:
29(1) (A;`) is sound (complete) w.r.t. d,
(2) d(') = X if (only if) ` ' for every disjunctive clause ' over A.
PROOF. Follows immediately by converting every formula ' 2 MA into
conjunctive normal form.
We can now tackle completeness for our basic proof system constructors.
Proposition 46 The proof system constructors PD and PId de¯ned in Exam-
ple 38 are one-step sound and complete w.r.t. [[SD]] and [[SId]], respectively.
PROOF. One-step soundness of both proof system constructors follows eas-
ily by unfolding their respective de¯nitions. To show one-step completeness,
we ¯x (A;`) that is complete w.r.t. d : A ! PX.
For the one-step completeness of PD, we have to show that (Cl ± PD)(A;`) =
(SDMA;`
0) is complete w.r.t. [[SD]](d]) : SDMA ! PD. Note that SDMA =
D, and hence ([[SD]](d]))] : MD ! PD is the inductive extension of the
mapping x 7! fxg. For ' 2 MD, we abbreviate ([[SD]](d]))](') by [[']]. Using
this notation, by Lemma 45 it su±ces to show that [[
Wm
i=1 :'i _
Wn
j=1 Ãj]] = X
implies `
0 Wm
i=1 :'i_
Wn
j=1 Ãj, where 'i;Ãj 2 D. That is, we have to show that
[[
Vm
i=1 'i]] µ [[
Wn
j=1 Ãj]] implies `
0 Vm
i=1 'i !
Wn
j=1 Ãj. Assuming that [[
Vm
i=1 'i]] µ
[[
Wn
j=1 Ãj]] holds, we have one of three cases:
Case m = 0. Then [[
Vm
i=1 'i]] = D µ [[
Wn
j=1 Ãj]], hence D is ¯nite and fÃj j
1 · j · ng = D. In this case, we have `
0 W
d2D d, and `
0 Wn
j=1 Ãj follows by
propositional reasoning.
Case f'i j 1 · i · mg = fdg for some d 2 D. Then there exists 1 · j · n
with Ãj = d = '1, and since d ! d is a propositional tautology, the claim
follows by propositional reasoning.
Case f'i j 1 · i · mg ¶ fd0;d1g for some d0 6= d1 2 D. Then [[
Vm
i=1 'i]] = ;,
and we have, by the de¯nition of PD, that
Vm
i=1 'i ! d0 ^ d1 ! ® !
Wn
j=1 Ãj,
and the proof of the claim is complete.
We now establish the one-step completeness of PId, where we have to show that
(Cl ± PId)(A;`) = (SIdMA;`
0) is complete w.r.t. [[SId]](d]) : SIdMA ! PX.
Similarly to the proof of the one-step completeness of PD, and also abbreviat-
ing ([[SId]](d]))](') by [[']], it su±ces to show that [[' ! Ã]] = X implies `
0 ' !
Ã, where ' =
Vm
i=1±'i and Ã =
Wn
j=1±Ãj with '1;:::;'m;Ã1;:::;Ãn 2 MA.
The assumption that [[' ! Ã]] = X together with the de¯nition of [[SId]] give
Tm
i=1 d]('i) µ
Sn
j=1 d](Ãj), or equivalently, d](
Vm
i=1 'i !
Wn
j=1 Ãj) = X. The
30completeness of (A;`) w.r.t. d now gives `
Vm
i=1 'i !
Wn
j=1 Ãj. Finally, the
axioms de¯ning PId can be used to derive ¯rst `
0 ±
Vm
i=1 'i !±
Wn
j=1 Ãj, and
then, also using propositional reasoning and modus ponens, `
0 Vm
i=1±'i !
Wn
j=1±Ãj. (Note that the ¯rst two axioms in the de¯nition of PId result in the
modal operator ± distributing over all boolean operators.) Thus, `
0 ' ! Ã.
This concludes the proof.
We proceed to establish one-step completeness for the powerset functor (as in
[24], but with a di®erent proof) and the probability distribution functor.
Proposition 47 The proof system constructors PP and PP! de¯ned in Ex-
ample 38 are one-step sound and complete w.r.t. [[SP]] and [[SP!]], respectively.
PROOF. The one-step soundness of PP w.r.t. [[SP]] follows easily from the
de¯nitions of PP and [[SP]]. To prove one-step completeness, we ¯x (A;`)
complete w.r.t. d : A ! PX, and show that (Cl ± PP)(A;`) = (SPMA;`
0)
is complete w.r.t. [[SP]](d]) : SPMA ! PPX. By Lemma 45, it su±ces to
show that ([[SP]](d]))](' ! Ã) = PX implies `
0 ' ! Ã, where ' =
Vm
i=1 2'i
and Ã =
Wn
j=1 2Ãj with '1;:::;'m;Ã1;:::;Ãn 2 MA. So assume, for the
sake of contradiction, that d](
Vm
i=1 'i) 6µ d](Ãj) for any j 2 f1;:::;ng. By
choosing xj 2 d](
Vm
i=1 'i) n d](Ãj) for j 2 f1;:::;ng, we obtain fx1;:::;xng 2
([[SP]](d]))](2
Vm
i=1 'i) = ([[SP]](d]))](
Vm
i=1 2'i) µ ([[SP]](d]))](
Wn
j=1 2Ãj). This
yields j0 2 f1;:::;ng such that fx1;:::;xng 2 ([[SP]](d]))](2Ãj0). But this
contradicts the fact that xj0 62 d](Ãj0). Hence, there exists some j 2 f1;:::;ng
such that d](
Vm
i=1 'i) µ d](Ãj) (or equivalently, d](
Vm
i=1 'i ! Ãj) = X). The
completeness of (A;`) w.r.t. d now gives `
Vm
i=1 'i ! Ãj. The last axiom in
the de¯nition of PP (see Example 38) then gives `
0 2
Vm
i=1 'i ! 2Ãj, which,
together with the second axiom in the de¯nition of PP and some suitable
use of propositional reasoning, yield `
0 Vm
i=1 2'i ! 2Ãj. Some further use of
propositional reasoning ¯nally gives `
0 Vm
i=1 2'i !
Wn
j=1 2Ãj, that is, `
0 ' !
Ã as required. The one-step soundness and completeness of PP! w.r.t. [[SP!]]
is proved similarly.
Proposition 48 The proof system constructor PD de¯ned in Example 38 is
one-step sound and complete w.r.t. [[SD]].
PROOF. The one-step soundness of PD w.r.t. [[SD]] follows easily from the
de¯nitions of PD and [[SD]] (see also the discussion motivating the last axiom
in Example 38).
The one-step completeness of PD w.r.t. [[SD]] is proved using a version of the
theorem of the alternative. Before stating this theorem, we ¯x some notation.
If Z is a sub-vector space of QN, we write Z? for the orthogonal subspace f¹ z 2
31QN j ¹ zz = 0 for every z 2 Zg, where, for z = (z1;:::;zN) and ¹ z = (¹ z1;:::; ¹ zN),
¹ zz = ¹ z1z1 + ::: + ¹ zNzN is the usual dot product. Also, if q 2 Q and I is an
interval in Q, we write q I for the interval in Q de¯ned by the set fq¤i j i 2 Ig.
We identify an element q 2 Q with the singleton set fqg and write I < J, for
I;J µ Q whenever i < j for all i 2 I and all j 2 J. In particular, I > 0 is
used as a shorthand for i > 0 for all i 2 I. Finally, if I1;:::;IN are intervals in
Q, we write I1 +:::+IN for the interval fi1 +:::+in j i1 2 I1;:::;iN 2 INg.
The previously-mentioned result can now be stated as follows.
Theorem 49 (Rockafellar [26]) Let Z be a subspace of QN and I1;:::;IN
be intervals in Q. Then, one and only one of the following alternatives holds:
(*) There exists a vector z = (z1;:::;zN) 2 Z such that z1 2 I1;:::;zN 2 IN;
(**) There exists a vector ¹ z = (¹ z1;:::; ¹ zN) 2 Z? such that ¹ z1 I1+:::+¹ zN IN > 0;
We now return to the proof of one-step completeness of PD. We ¯x (A;`)
complete w.r.t. d : A ! PX, and show that (Cl ± PD)(A;`) = (SDMA;`
0) is
complete w.r.t. [[SD]](d]) : SDMA ! PDX. Again, by Lemma 45, it su±ces to
show that ([[SD]](d]))](' ! Ã) = DX implies `
0 ' ! Ã, where ' =
Vm
i=1 L®i'i
and Ã =
Wn
j=1 L¯jÃj with '1;:::;'m;Ã1;:::;Ãn 2 MA. This can, in turn, be
reduced (through propositional reasoning and the use of the second axiom in
the de¯nition of PD) to showing that `
0 L1tt ^ ' ^ :Ã ! ®. To show this,
let ®0 = 1 and '0 = tt, and consider all (¯nitely many) formulas of form
» = '0
0 ^:::^'0
m ^Ã0
1 ^:::^Ã0
n, where each '0
i is either 'i or :'i, each Ã0
j is
either Ãj or :Ãj, and such that 6` » ! ®. Now let ¥ contain exactly one such
» from each equivalence class for the equivalence relation » » »0 i® ` » $ »0.
Some immediate properties of ¥ are:
² ` » ^ »0 ! ® for any »;»0 2 ¥ s.t. » 6= »0,
² `
W
»2¥ ».
Next, let L0 µ MSDMA consist of formulas which contain only 'is, Ãjs and »s
as atomic sub-formulas, and only multiples of 1
q as probability values, where q
is the smallest common denominator of ®1;:::;®m;¯1;:::;¯n. Showing that
`
0 L1tt^'^:Ã ! ® can be reduced (through propositional reasoning and the
use of the fourth axiom in the de¯nition of PD) to showing that `
0 Vm
i=0 L®i'i^
Vn
j=1(M¯jÃj^:E¯jÃj) ! ®. So assume, for the sake of contradiction, that this
does not hold. We can then construct a maximally consistent set of formulas
© µ L0 which contains L®i'i for i = 0;:::;m, as well as M¯jÃj and :E¯jÃj
for j = 1;:::;n. As a result of being maximal, © will contain, for each ³ 2
f'0;:::;'mg [ fÃ1;:::;Ãng [ ¥ and each m 2 [0;1] which is a multiple of 1
q,
one of Lm³ or :Lm³, one of Mm³ or :Mm³, and one of Em³ or :Em³. We
now de¯ne
m³ = maxfm j Lm³ 2 ©g M³ = minfm j Mm³ 2 ©g
32for ³ 2 f'0;:::;'mg[fÃ1;:::;Ãng[¥. The fact that © is maximally consistent
gives:
² m³ · M³,
² either m³ = M³ and Em³³ 2 ©, or m³ 6= M³ and E®³ 62 © for any ®,
² m'0 = M'0 = 1,
where the ¯rst and third axioms in the de¯nition of PD are needed to obtain
the last statement. We can then apply Rockafellar's theorem to the subspace
Z = f(v³)³2f'0;:::;'mg[fÃ1;:::;Ãng[¥ j v³ 2 Q;
X
»2¥
`»!'i
v» = v'i;
X
»2¥
`»!Ãj
v» = vÃjg;
where » ranges over ¥, and to the intervals I³ de¯ned by
I³ =
8
<
:
(m³;M³) if m³ 6= M³
fm³g if m³ = M³
;
The ¯rst alternative in Rockafellar's theorem yields a vector
(v³)³2f'0;:::;'mg[fÃ1;:::;Ãng[¥ 2 Z
such that v³ 2 I³ for each ³. This, in turn, allows us to construct a probability
distribution ¹ : X ! [0;1] which has the property that ¹([[³]]) 2 I³ for each ³
(where we use ¹([[³]]) as a shorthand for
P
x2d](³) ¹(x)), and moreover, satis¯es
all formulas in ©: we pick x» 2 d(») 6= ; (as » 6` ® and (A;`) is complete
w.r.t. d) for each » 2 ¥, and de¯ne ¹(x») = v» for each » 2 ¥, and ¹(x) = 0
elsewhere. The properties of ¥ mentioned earlier together with the soundness
of (A;`) w.r.t. d ensure that ¹ is a probability distribution:
P
»2¥
v» =
P
»`tt
v» =
P
»`'0
v» = v'0 2 fm'0g = f1g. Also, by construction, ¹([[»]]) = v» 2 I», while for
' 2 f'1;:::;'mg, the fact that ¹([[']]) 2 I' follows from ¹([[']]) =
P
»`'
¹([[»]]) =
P
»`'
v» = v', and similarly for Ã 2 fÃ1;:::;Ãng. Finally, the fact that ¹ satis¯es
all formulas in © follows by case analysis on the basic formulas in ©:
² If L®³ 2 ©, then ® · m³, and hence ¹([[³]]) ¸ m³ ¸ ®, i.e. ¹ satis¯es
the formula L®³. If :L®³ 2 ©, then since © is maximally consistent, the
fourth axiom in the de¯nition of PD together with propositional reasoning
give M®³ 2 © and :E®³ 2 ©; hence, ® ¸ M³, and either M³ = m³ 6= ® or
M³ 6= m³. In the ¯rst case, ¹([[³]]) = M³ < ®, whereas in the second case,
¹([[³]]) < M³ · ®. Hence, in both cases, ¹ satis¯es the formula :L®³.
² The cases of M®³ 2 © and :M®³ 2 © are treated similarly.
² The cases of E®³ 2 © and :E®³ 2 © are treated using the de¯nition of
E®³.
33Now since © contains L®i'i for i = 0;:::;m, as well as M¯jÃj and :E¯jÃj
for j = 1;:::;n, we have ¹ 2 [[(SD]](d]))](')n([[SD]](d]))](Ã). Thus, under this
alternative, we have arrived at a contradiction.
The second alternative in Rockafellar's theorem yields values a³, with ³ 2
f'0;:::;'mg [ fÃ1;:::;Ãng [ ¥, subject to the following conditions:
(1)
P
³
a³v³ = 0 for all v 2 Z;
(2)
P
³
a³ I³ > 0.
By manipulating these (in)equalities, namely multiplying by the least common
denominator of the a³s and separating positive coe±cients from negative ones,
we obtain non-negative integer values b³ and b0
³, with ³ 2 f'0;:::;'mg [
fÃ1;:::;Ãng [ ¥, such that:
X
³
b³v³ =
X
³
b
0
³v³ for all v 2 Z (1)
X
³
b³ I³ >
X
³
b
0
³ I³ (2)
We then de¯ne the formulas ³1;:::;³k;³0
1;:::;³0
l 2 f'0;:::;'mg[fÃ1;:::;Ãng[
¥, by taking b³ copies of each ³ in ³1;:::;³k, and b0
³ copies of each ³ in ³0
1;:::;³0
l.
We immediately obtain Lm³i³i 2 © for i = 1;:::;k and MM³0
j
³0
j 2 © for
j = 1;:::;l. Moreover, the following hold:
(1) `
Vmax(k;l)
i=1 ³(i) $ ³0(i)
(2)
P
i=1;:::;k
m³i >
P
j=1;:::;l
M³0
j
To see why the statement in item 1 above is true, note that the equality (1)
results in the sum of the characteristic functions of d](³1);:::;d](³k) being
equal to the sum of the characteristic functions of d](³0
1);:::;d](³0
l): for each
x 2 X, substituting the vector v 2 Z de¯ned by v³ = 1 if x 2 d](³) and v³ = 0
otherwise into (1) gives the equality of the previously-mentioned functions on
the value x. As a result, we have d](³(i)) = d](³0(i)) for i = 1;:::;max(k;l), and
hence d](
Vmax(k;l)
i=1 ³(i) $ ³0(i)) = X. Now the completeness of (A;`) w.r.t. d :
A ! PX gives `
Vmax(k;l)
i=1 ³(i) $ ³0(i).
The inequality in item 2 above follows directly from the inequality (2), after
recalling that I³ is either the set fm³g or the open interval (m³;M³), and
hence the lower endpoint of the interval
P
³
b³ I³ is
P
i=1;:::;k
m³i, while the upper
endpoint of the interval
P
³
b0
³ I³ is
P
j=1;:::;l
M³0
j.
34Now let p = M³0
1 and q = m³1+:::+m³k¡(M³0
2+:::+M³0
l). Item 1 together with
the last axiom de¯ning `
0 give `
0 (
Vk
i=1 Lm³i³i)^(
Vl
j=2 MM³0
j
³0
j) ! Lq³0
1. Hence,
since © is maximally consistent, and since each of Lm³i³i with i = 1;:::;k and
MM³0
j
³0
j with j = 2;:::;l belong to ©, so does Lq³0
1. Moreover, by item 2 we
have p < q, hence (1¡p)+q > 1. Now Mp³0
1 2 © implies, by the de¯nition of
Mp, that L1¡p:³0
1 2 ©, hence, by the third axiom in the de¯nition of PD, we
have :Lq³0
1 2 ©, as (1 ¡ p) + q > 1. As also Lq³0
1 2 ©, we have arrived at the
required contradiction also under the second alternative. This concludes the
proof.
We note that, while the proof of one-step completeness of PD resembles the
completeness proof in [10] (which also uses Rockafellar's theorem), the one-
step completeness of PD will, in addition, allow the modular derivation of
completeness results for functor combinations.
In what follows, we show how one can combine proof system constructors
for simple languages in order to derive proof systems constructors, and hence
proof systems, for more complex languages. Moreover, we show that whenever
the building blocks of such constructions are one-step sound and complete
w.r.t. some given one-step semantics, the resulting proof systems are sound
and complete w.r.t. the induced coalgebraic semantics. For ease of exposition,
we abbreviate [·i]' := :h·ii:' 2 M((S1 © S2)L), where ' 2 MSiL and
i 2 f1;2g.
De¯nition 50 (Combinations of proof system constructors) Let (A1;`1)
and (A2;`2) be boolean theories.
(1) We let (A1;`1)­(A2;`2) = (MA1 ­MA2;`­), where ­ is de¯ned on
sets as in De¯nition 10, and the predicate `­ is de¯ned by the following
axioms:
`­ [¼i]® ! ® `­ [¼i](' ! Ã) $ ([¼i]' ! [¼i]Ã)
`i ' ! Ã
`­ [¼i]' ! [¼i]Ã
(2) We let (A1;`1)©(A2;`2) = (MA1 ©MA2;`©), where © is de¯ned on
sets as in De¯nition 10, and the predicate `© is de¯ned by the following
axioms:
`© [·i]tt `© [·i]' ^ [·i]Ã ! [·i](' ^ Ã)
`© [·1]® _ [·2]® `© [·i](' _ Ã) ! [·i]' _ [·i]Ã
`© [·1]® ^ [·2]® ! ® `i ' ! Ã
`© [·i]' ! [·i]Ã
35(3) For an arbitrary set E, we let (A1;`1) ¯ E = ((MA1) ¯ E;`¯E), where
¯ E is de¯ned on sets as in De¯nition 10, and the predicate `¯E is
de¯ned by the following axioms:
`¯E [e]® ! ® `¯E [e](' ! Ã) $ ([e]' ! [e]Ã)
`1 ' ! Ã
`¯E [e]' ! [e]Ã
If P1 and P2 are proof system constructors for S1 and S2, respectively, de¯ne:
(P1 ­ P2)(A;`) = (Cl ± P1)(A;`) ­ (Cl ± P2)(A;`)
(P1 © P2)(A;`) = (Cl ± P1)(A;`) © (Cl ± P2)(A;`)
(P1 ¯ E)(A;`) = (Cl ± P1)(A;`) ¯ E
(P1  P2)(A;`) = (P1 ± Cl ± P2)(A;`)
We note in passing that, in the case of `­ and `¯E, the axiomatisations used
here have been chosen so as to minimise the number of axioms required. An
alternative, equivalent axiomatisation for `­, which is closer in spirit to the
de¯nition of `©, can be given by replacing the ¯rst two axioms in the de¯nition
of `­ by:
`­ [¼i]tt `­ [¼i]' ^ [¼i]Ã ! [¼i](' ^ Ã)
`­ [¼i]:' ! :[¼i]' `­ [¼i](' _ Ã) ! [¼i]' _ [¼i]Ã
(and similarly for `¯E).
With these de¯nitions, we obtain that one-step soundness and completeness
are preserved by combinations of proof system constructors; for readability we
have suppressed the dependency of the one-step semantics on the signature
functor.
Proposition 51 Suppose Pi is a proof system constructor for Si, for i = 1;2,
and E is an arbitrary set. Then, P1 ­ P2, P1 © P2, P1 ¯ E and P1  P2 are
proof system constructors for S1­S2, S1©S2, S1¯E and S1S2, respectively.
Moreover, if P1 and P2 are one-step sound (complete) w.r.t. [[S1]] and [[S2]],
respectively, then P1 ­ P2, P1 © P2, P1 ¯ E and P1  P2 are one-step sound
(complete) w.r.t. [[S1 ­ S2]], [[S1 © S2]], [[S1 ¯ E]] and [[S1  S2]], respectively.
PROOF. It is immediate from the de¯nitions that P1 ­ P2, P1 © P2, P1 ¯ E
and P1  P2 are proof system constructors. Also, the one-step soundness and
completeness of P1  P2 follows directly from the de¯nitions.
36Checking the one-step soundness of P1 ­ P2, P1 © P2 and P1 ¯ E is just a
matter of unfolding the respective de¯nitions. For the one-step completeness
of P1 ­ P2, P1 © P2 and P1 ¯ E, we assume that Pi is one-step complete
w.r.t. the one-step semantics [[Si]], where [[Si]] = [[Si]]Ti is a one-step semantics
for Si w.r.t. the endofunctor Ti, for i = 1;2. Throughout the proof, we ¯x
(A;`) 2 BTh complete w.r.t. d : A ! PX. We write `P for the entailment
relation on (Cl ± P)(A;`), whenever P is a proof system constructor.
We ¯rst consider the one-step completeness of P1 ­ P2 w.r.t. [[S1 ­ S2]]. We
have to show that (Cl ± (P1 ­ P2))(A;`) is complete w.r.t. [[S1 ­ S2]](d]) :
MS1MA ­ MS2MA ! P(T1X £ T2X). By Lemma 45, it su±ces to show
that ([[S1 ­ S2]](d]))](' ! Ã) = T1X £ T2X implies `P1­P2 ' ! Ã, where
' =
Vn
i=1[¼1]'1
i ^
Vm
j=1[¼2]'2
j and Ã =
Wl
i=1[¼1]Ã1
i _
Wk
j=1[¼2]Ã2
j. Using the
fact that [¼i], for i = 1;2, distributes over all propositional connectives (as a
result of the axioms in the de¯nition of `P1­P2), this can be reduced further
to assuming ' = [¼1]'1 ^ [¼2]'2 and Ã = [¼1]Ã1 _ [¼2]Ã2 (where we take '1
and '2 to be tt if n = 0 or m = 0, respectively, and Ã1 and Ã2 to be ® if l = 0
or k = 0, respectively). Writing S for S1 ­ S2, our assumption is now
([[S]](d
]))
]([¼1]'1) \ ([[S]](d
]))
]([¼2]'2) µ ([[S]](d
]))
]([¼1]Ã1) [ ([[S]](d
]))
]([¼2]Ã2)
and we have to show that `P1­P2 [¼1]'1 ^ [¼2]'2 ! [¼1]Ã1 _ [¼2]Ã2.
Unravelling the de¯nition of [[S]] = [[S1 ­ S2]], we obtain that ([[Si]](d]))]('i) µ
([[Si]](d]))](Ãi) for i = 1 or i = 2. By completeness of Pi, we obtain that
`Pi 'i ! Ãi, and from the de¯nition of `P1­P2, we conclude `P1­P2 [¼i]'i !
[¼i]Ãi, from which we obtain the desired conclusion `P1­P2 [¼1]'1 ^ [¼2]'2 !
[¼1]'1_[¼2]'2 by propositional reasoning. The one-step completeness of P1¯E
is proved analogously.
We now turn to the completeness of P1©P2 w.r.t. [[S1©S2]]. As above, it su±ces
to show that ([[S1 © S2]](d]))](' ! Ã) = T1X + T2X implies `P1©P2 ' ! Ã,
where ' =
Vn
i=1[·1]'1
i ^
Vm
j=1[·2]'2
j and Ã =
Wl
i=1[·1]Ã1
i _
Wk
j=1[·2]Ã2
j. We
distinguish several cases:
Case 1. l = k = 0. Then Ã = ® and ([[S1 © S2]](d]))](') = ;. Let '1 =
Vn
i=1 '1
i
and '2 =
Vm
j=1 '2
j. Then ([[S1]](d]))]('1) = ; and ([[S2]](d]))]('2) = ; by the
de¯nition of [[S1 © S2]], hence `P1 '1 ! ® and `P2 '2 ! ® by one-step
completeness of P1 and P2. Using the last rule in the de¯nition of `P1©P2, the
axiom `© [·1]® ^ [·2]® ! ® and propositional reasoning, we obtain `P1©P2
[·1]'1 ^ [·2]'2 ! ®. Given that [·i] distributes over conjunctions (as a result
of the axioms in the de¯nition of `P1©P2), this shows `P1©P2 ' ! Ã.
Case 2. l > 0 and k = 0. Taking Ã1 =
Wl
i=1 Ã1
i and '1;'2 as above, we have
([[S1 © S2]](d
]))
]([·1]'1) \ ([[S1 © S2]](d
]))
]([·2]'2) µ ([[S1 © S2]](d
]))
]([·1]Ã1)
37from which we deduce that ([[S1]](d]))]('1) µ ([[S1]](d]))](Ã1) by the de¯nition
of [[S1©S2]]. Hence, by one-step completeness of P1 and P2, we have `P1 '1 !
Ã1, which yields `P1©P2 [·1]'1 ! [·1]Ã1, and our claim `P1©P2 ' ! Ã follows
by propositional reasoning, using the distributivity of [·1] over conjunctions
and non-empty disjunctions.
Case 3. l = 0 and k > 0. Similar.
Case 4. l > 0 and k > 0. Taking '1;'2;Ã1 as above and Ã2 =
Wk
j=1 '2
j, we have
that `P1©P2 [·1]® _ [·2]® ! [·1]Ã1 _ [·2]Ã2, hence `P1©P2 [·1]Ã1 _ [·2]Ã2 and
therefore `P1©P2 [·1]'1^[·2]'2 ! [·1]Ã1_[·2]Ã2. The claim that `P1©P2 ' ! Ã
now follows by propositional reasoning, using the fact that [·i] distributes over
conjunctions and non-empty disjunctions.
An important observation is that, if P1 and P2 are de¯ned in terms of axioms
(as is, for instance, the case for PP and PD), then all their combinations can
be described in the same way (namely by incorporating the axioms of De¯-
nition 50 together with all propositional tautologies and modus ponens with
the original de¯nitions of P1 and P2). Below we only give the full axiomatic
de¯nition of P1P2. The de¯nitions of P1­P2, P1©P2 and P1¯E are similar.
Recall from Example 11 that the composition of syntax constructors can be
thought of as introducing an additional sort. In the same way, the composition
of proof system constructors can be regarded as introducing a derivability
predicate on formulas of this sort: suppose P1 and P2 are de¯ned in terms of
the rules (possibly with empty premise) R1 and R2, respectively. Then, for a
boolean theory (A;`), the boolean theory (P1P2)(A;`) = (S1MS2MA;`
00) is
generated using an intermediate derivability predicate `
0 on S2MA, by means
of the following axioms:
` '
`
0 ½
(if
` '
`
0 ½
2 R2)
`
0 ½
(if ½ is an instance of a tautology)
`
0 ½ `
0 ½ ! ½0
`
0 ½0 (modus ponens for `
0)
`
0 ½
`
00 '0 (if
`
0 ½
`
00 '0 2 R1)
where S1 and S2 are the syntax constructors associated to P1 and P2, respec-
tively, ' ranges over formulas in MA, ½ and ½0 range over formulas in MS2MA,
and '0 ranges over formulas in MS1MS2MA. In particular, the second and
third rules account for the presence of Cl in the de¯nition of P1  P2.
As we have already argued in the beginning, a large class of systems, in-
cluding Kripke structures, (probabilistic) transition systems and probabilistic
automata can be modelled as coalgebras of signature functors of the following
38form:
T ::= D j Id j P! j P j D j T1 £ T2 j T1 + T2 j T1
E j T1 ± T2:
where D and E are arbitrary sets.
We can therefore use Propositions 12, 26, 35 and 51 to derive, for any (prob-
abilistic) system type of the above form, a logic which is sound and complete,
and which is also expressive provided that the unbounded powerset functor is
not used in the signature functor.
Example 52 (Probabilistic automata) Simple probabilistic automata [29]
are modelled coalgebraically using the functor T = (P ± D)E. The language
L1 = L(T) obtained by applying the modular techniques presented in Section
3 can be described by the following grammar:
L1 3 ' ::= ® j ' ! '
0 j [e]Ã (Ã 2 L2)
L2 3 Ã ::= ® j Ã ! Ã
0 j 2» (» 2 L3)
L3 3 » ::= ® j » ! »
0 j Lp' (' 2 L1)
The coalgebraic semantics j=1 of L1 is obtained automatically from the one-
step semantics for SP and SD (as de¯ned in Example 21), using the modular
techniques presented in Section 4. The resulting logic is essentially the same
as the probabilistic modal logic of [13]. Moreover, if we replace the unbounded
powerset functor by its ¯nite variant in the signature functor T and adjust
the one-step semantics according to Example 21, Proposition 35 automatically
yields a Hennessy-Milner result for this logic (w.r.t. image-¯nite simple prob-
abilistic automata).
In addition, the techniques described in this section allow us to derive a sound
and complete proof system for the above logic, both w.r.t. simple probabilis-
tic automata and w.r.t. their image-¯nite variants. This proof system can be
described by three entailment relations, corresponding to entailment in L1;L2
and L3, respectively, as follows:
0. Axioms for all `i (';Ã 2 Li):
`i ' (' instance of tautology)
`i ' `i ' ! Ã
`i Ã
1. Axioms for `1 (';Ã 2 L2, e 2 E):
`1 [e]® ! ® `1 [e](' ! Ã) $ ([e]' ! [e]Ã)
`2 ' ! Ã
`1 [e]' ! [e]Ã
392. Axioms for `2 (';Ã 2 L3):
`2 2tt `2 2' ^ 2Ã ! 2(' ^ Ã)
`3 ' ! Ã
`2 2' ! 2Ã
3. Axioms for `3 (';Ã;'i;Ãj 2 L1, p;q 2 Q\[0;1] with p+q > 1, m;n ¸ 0):
`3 L0' `3 Lptt `3 Lp' ! :Lq:' `3 :Lp' ! Mp'
`1
Vmax(m;n)
k=1 '(k) $ Ã(k)
`3 (
Vm
i=1 Lpi'i) ^ (
Vn
j=2 MqiÃi) ! Lp1+:::+pm¡(q2+:::+qn)Ã1
Now Proposition 42 shows that the entailment relation `1 de¯ned above co-
incides with the entailment relation de¯ned by iteratively applying the corre-
sponding proof system constructor. Since all our constructions preserve com-
pleteness, we obtain j=T ' i® `1 ' for all ' 2 L1, i.e. completeness of `1
w.r.t. the coalgebraic semantics of L1.
7 Conclusions
We have studied modular construction principles for coalgebraic logics. When
modelling systems coalgebraically, one typically constructs an endofunctor
that represents the behaviour of the associated class of systems from a small
number of basic ingredients, such as constants, powersets and probability dis-
tributions, by means of a small number of operations, viz products, coproducts
and functor composition. We have demonstrated that this modular approach
carries over to the associated logics. On the logical side, every endofunctor
is paired with a proof system constructor, and operations on endofunctors
such as products and functor composition give rise to corresponding oper-
ations on proof system constructors. By showing that the basic ingredients
admit a (sound and) complete proof system, we have shown (soundness and)
completeness for combined systems by showing that the operations on proof
system constructors preserve (soundness and) completeness. In this way, we
have obtained (sound and) complete logics for a wide range of state based
systems, in particular for the probabilistic automata of [29], for which com-
pleteness was hitherto an open question.
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